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// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
Arc, RwLock,
},
};
use as_variant::as_variant;
use ruma::{
api::client::keys::upload_signatures::v3::Request as SignatureUploadRequest,
events::{
key::verification::VerificationMethod, room::message::KeyVerificationRequestEventContent,
},
DeviceId, EventId, OwnedDeviceId, OwnedUserId, RoomId, UserId,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize};
use serde_json::Value;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
error::SignatureError,
store::{Changes, IdentityChanges, Store},
types::{MasterPubkey, SelfSigningPubkey, UserSigningPubkey},
verification::VerificationMachine,
CryptoStoreError, DeviceData, OutgoingVerificationRequest, VerificationRequest,
};
/// Enum over the different user identity types we can have.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum UserIdentity {
/// Our own user identity.
Own(OwnUserIdentity),
/// An identity belonging to another user.
Other(OtherUserIdentity),
}
impl UserIdentity {
/// Destructure the enum into an [`OwnUserIdentity`] if it's of the correct
/// type.
pub fn own(self) -> Option<OwnUserIdentity> {
as_variant!(self, Self::Own)
}
/// Destructure the enum into an [`OtherUserIdentity`] if it's of the
/// correct type.
pub fn other(self) -> Option<OtherUserIdentity> {
as_variant!(self, Self::Other)
}
/// Get the ID of the user this identity belongs to.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(u) => u.user_id(),
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.user_id(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn new(
store: Store,
identity: UserIdentityData,
verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
own_identity: Option<OwnUserIdentityData>,
) -> Self {
match identity {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => {
Self::Own(OwnUserIdentity { inner: i, verification_machine, store })
}
UserIdentityData::Other(i) => {
Self::Other(OtherUserIdentity { inner: i, own_identity, verification_machine })
}
}
}
/// Check if this user identity is verified.
///
/// For our own identity, this means either that we have checked the public
/// keys in the identity against the private keys; or that the identity
/// has been manually marked as verified via
/// [`OwnUserIdentity::verify`].
///
/// For another user's identity, it means that we have verified our own
/// identity as above, *and* that the other user's identity has been signed
/// by our own user-signing key.
pub fn is_verified(&self) -> bool {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(u) => u.is_verified(),
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.is_verified(),
}
}
/// True if we verified this identity at some point in the past.
///
/// To reset this latch back to `false`, one must call
/// [`UserIdentity::withdraw_verification()`].
pub fn was_previously_verified(&self) -> bool {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(u) => u.was_previously_verified(),
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.was_previously_verified(),
}
}
/// Reset the flag that records that the identity has been verified, thus
/// clearing [`UserIdentity::was_previously_verified`] and
/// [`UserIdentity::has_verification_violation`].
pub async fn withdraw_verification(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(u) => u.withdraw_verification().await,
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.withdraw_verification().await,
}
}
/// Remember this identity, ensuring it does not result in a pin violation.
///
/// When we first see a user, we assume their cryptographic identity has not
/// been tampered with by the homeserver or another entity with
/// man-in-the-middle capabilities. We remember this identity and call this
/// action "pinning".
///
/// If the identity presented for the user changes later on, the newly
/// presented identity is considered to be in "pin violation". This
/// method explicitly accepts the new identity, allowing it to replace
/// the previously pinned one and bringing it out of pin violation.
///
/// UIs should display a warning to the user when encountering an identity
/// which is not verified and is in pin violation. See
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::identity_needs_user_approval`].
pub async fn pin(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(_) => {
// Nothing to be done for our own identity: we already
// consider it trusted in this sense.
Ok(())
}
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.pin_current_master_key().await,
}
}
/// Was this identity previously verified, and is no longer?
pub fn has_verification_violation(&self) -> bool {
match self {
UserIdentity::Own(u) => u.has_verification_violation(),
UserIdentity::Other(u) => u.has_verification_violation(),
}
}
}
impl From<OwnUserIdentity> for UserIdentity {
fn from(i: OwnUserIdentity) -> Self {
Self::Own(i)
}
}
impl From<OtherUserIdentity> for UserIdentity {
fn from(i: OtherUserIdentity) -> Self {
Self::Other(i)
}
}
/// Struct representing a cross signing identity of a user.
///
/// This is the user identity of a user that is our own. Other users will
/// only contain a master key and a self signing key, meaning that only device
/// signatures can be checked with this identity.
///
/// This struct wraps the [`OwnUserIdentityData`] type and allows a verification
/// to be requested to verify our own device with the user identity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct OwnUserIdentity {
pub(crate) inner: OwnUserIdentityData,
pub(crate) verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
store: Store,
}
impl Deref for OwnUserIdentity {
type Target = OwnUserIdentityData;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.inner
}
}
impl DerefMut for OwnUserIdentity {
fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut <Self as Deref>::Target {
&mut self.inner
}
}
impl OwnUserIdentity {
/// Mark our user identity as verified.
///
/// This will mark the identity locally as verified and sign it with our own
/// device.
///
/// Returns a signature upload request that needs to be sent out.
pub async fn verify(&self) -> Result<SignatureUploadRequest, SignatureError> {
self.mark_as_verified();
let changes = Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges {
changed: vec![self.inner.clone().into()],
new: vec![],
unchanged: vec![],
},
..Default::default()
};
if let Err(e) = self.verification_machine.store.save_changes(changes).await {
error!(error = ?e, "Couldn't store our own user identity after marking it as verified");
}
let cache = self.store.cache().await?;
let account = cache.account().await?;
account.sign_master_key(&self.master_key)
}
/// Send a verification request to our other devices.
pub async fn request_verification(
&self,
) -> Result<(VerificationRequest, OutgoingVerificationRequest), CryptoStoreError> {
self.request_verification_helper(None).await
}
/// Send a verification request to our other devices while specifying our
/// supported methods.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `methods` - The verification methods that we're supporting.
pub async fn request_verification_with_methods(
&self,
methods: Vec<VerificationMethod>,
) -> Result<(VerificationRequest, OutgoingVerificationRequest), CryptoStoreError> {
self.request_verification_helper(Some(methods)).await
}
/// Does our user identity trust our own device, i.e. have we signed our
/// own device keys with our self-signing key.
pub async fn trusts_our_own_device(&self) -> Result<bool, CryptoStoreError> {
Ok(if let Some(signatures) = self.verification_machine.store.device_signatures().await? {
let mut device_keys = self.store.cache().await?.account().await?.device_keys();
device_keys.signatures = signatures;
self.inner.self_signing_key().verify_device_keys(&device_keys).is_ok()
} else {
false
})
}
async fn request_verification_helper(
&self,
methods: Option<Vec<VerificationMethod>>,
) -> Result<(VerificationRequest, OutgoingVerificationRequest), CryptoStoreError> {
let all_devices = self.verification_machine.store.get_user_devices(self.user_id()).await?;
let devices = self
.inner
.filter_devices_to_request(all_devices, self.verification_machine.own_device_id());
Ok(self.verification_machine.request_to_device_verification(
self.user_id(),
devices,
methods,
))
}
/// Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified.
pub async fn withdraw_verification(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
self.inner.withdraw_verification();
let to_save = UserIdentityData::Own(self.inner.clone());
let changes = Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges { changed: vec![to_save], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
};
self.verification_machine.store.inner().save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(())
}
}
/// Struct representing a cross signing identity of a user.
///
/// This is the user identity of a user that isn't our own. Other users will
/// only contain a master key and a self signing key, meaning that only device
/// signatures can be checked with this identity.
///
/// This struct wraps a read-only version of the struct and allows verifications
/// to be requested to verify our own device with the user identity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct OtherUserIdentity {
pub(crate) inner: OtherUserIdentityData,
pub(crate) own_identity: Option<OwnUserIdentityData>,
pub(crate) verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
}
impl Deref for OtherUserIdentity {
type Target = OtherUserIdentityData;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.inner
}
}
impl DerefMut for OtherUserIdentity {
fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut <Self as Deref>::Target {
&mut self.inner
}
}
impl OtherUserIdentity {
/// Is this user identity verified.
pub fn is_verified(&self) -> bool {
self.own_identity
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|own_identity| own_identity.is_identity_verified(&self.inner))
}
/// Manually verify this user.
///
/// This method will attempt to sign the user identity using our private
/// cross signing key.
///
/// This method fails if we don't have the private part of our user-signing
/// key.
///
/// Returns a request that needs to be sent out for the user to be marked
/// as verified.
pub async fn verify(&self) -> Result<SignatureUploadRequest, SignatureError> {
if self.user_id() != self.verification_machine.own_user_id() {
Ok(self
.verification_machine
.store
.private_identity
.lock()
.await
.sign_user(&self.inner)
.await?)
} else {
Err(SignatureError::UserIdMismatch)
}
}
/// Create a [`VerificationRequest`] object after the verification request
/// content has been sent out.
pub fn request_verification(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
request_event_id: &EventId,
methods: Option<Vec<VerificationMethod>>,
) -> VerificationRequest {
self.verification_machine.request_verification(
&self.inner,
room_id,
request_event_id,
methods,
)
}
/// Send a verification request to the given user.
///
/// The returned content needs to be sent out into a DM room with the given
/// user.
///
/// After the content has been sent out a [`VerificationRequest`] can be
/// started with the [`OtherUserIdentity::request_verification()`] method.
pub fn verification_request_content(
&self,
methods: Option<Vec<VerificationMethod>>,
) -> KeyVerificationRequestEventContent {
VerificationRequest::request(
self.verification_machine.own_user_id(),
self.verification_machine.own_device_id(),
self.user_id(),
methods,
)
}
/// Pin the current identity (public part of the master signing key).
pub async fn pin_current_master_key(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
self.inner.pin();
let to_save = UserIdentityData::Other(self.inner.clone());
let changes = Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges { changed: vec![to_save], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
};
self.verification_machine.store.inner().save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Has the identity changed in a way that requires approval from the user?
///
/// A user identity needs approval if it changed after the crypto machine
/// has already observed ("pinned") a different identity for that user,
/// unless it is an explicitly verified identity (using for example
/// interactive verification).
///
/// This situation can be resolved by:
///
/// - Verifying the new identity with
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::request_verification`], or:
/// - Updating the pin to the new identity with
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::pin_current_master_key`].
pub fn identity_needs_user_approval(&self) -> bool {
// First check if the current identity is verified.
if self.is_verified() {
return false;
}
// If not we can check the pinned identity. Verification always have
// higher priority than pinning.
self.inner.has_pin_violation()
}
/// Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified.
pub async fn withdraw_verification(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
self.inner.withdraw_verification();
let to_save = UserIdentityData::Other(self.inner.clone());
let changes = Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges { changed: vec![to_save], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
};
self.verification_machine.store.inner().save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(())
}
// Test helper
#[cfg(test)]
pub async fn mark_as_previously_verified(&self) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
self.inner.mark_as_previously_verified();
let to_save = UserIdentityData::Other(self.inner.clone());
let changes = Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges { changed: vec![to_save], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
};
self.verification_machine.store.inner().save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Was this identity verified since initial observation and is not anymore?
///
/// Such a violation should be reported to the local user by the
/// application, and resolved by
///
/// - Verifying the new identity with
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::request_verification`]
/// - Or by withdrawing the verification requirement
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::withdraw_verification`].
pub fn has_verification_violation(&self) -> bool {
if !self.inner.was_previously_verified() {
// If that identity has never been verified it cannot be in violation.
return false;
};
!self.is_verified()
}
}
/// Enum over the different user identity types we can have.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum UserIdentityData {
/// Our own user identity.
Own(OwnUserIdentityData),
/// The identity of another user.
Other(OtherUserIdentityData),
}
impl From<OwnUserIdentityData> for UserIdentityData {
fn from(identity: OwnUserIdentityData) -> Self {
UserIdentityData::Own(identity)
}
}
impl From<OtherUserIdentityData> for UserIdentityData {
fn from(identity: OtherUserIdentityData) -> Self {
UserIdentityData::Other(identity)
}
}
impl UserIdentityData {
/// The unique user id of this identity.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
match self {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => i.user_id(),
UserIdentityData::Other(i) => i.user_id(),
}
}
/// Get the master key of the identity.
pub fn master_key(&self) -> &MasterPubkey {
match self {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => i.master_key(),
UserIdentityData::Other(i) => i.master_key(),
}
}
/// Get the [`SelfSigningPubkey`] key of the identity.
pub fn self_signing_key(&self) -> &SelfSigningPubkey {
match self {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => &i.self_signing_key,
UserIdentityData::Other(i) => &i.self_signing_key,
}
}
/// Get the user-signing key of the identity, this is only present for our
/// own user identity..
pub fn user_signing_key(&self) -> Option<&UserSigningPubkey> {
match self {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => Some(&i.user_signing_key),
UserIdentityData::Other(_) => None,
}
}
/// True if we verified our own identity at some point in the past.
///
/// To reset this latch back to `false`, one must call
/// [`UserIdentity::withdraw_verification()`].
pub fn was_previously_verified(&self) -> bool {
match self {
UserIdentityData::Own(i) => i.was_previously_verified(),
UserIdentityData::Other(i) => i.was_previously_verified(),
}
}
/// Convert the enum into a reference [`OwnUserIdentityData`] if it's of
/// the correct type.
pub fn own(&self) -> Option<&OwnUserIdentityData> {
as_variant!(self, Self::Own)
}
/// Convert the enum into an [`OwnUserIdentityData`] if it's of the correct
/// type.
pub(crate) fn into_own(self) -> Option<OwnUserIdentityData> {
as_variant!(self, Self::Own)
}
/// Convert the enum into a reference to [`OtherUserIdentityData`] if
/// it's of the correct type.
pub fn other(&self) -> Option<&OtherUserIdentityData> {
as_variant!(self, Self::Other)
}
}
/// Struct representing a cross signing identity of a user.
///
/// This is the user identity of a user that isn't our own. Other users will
/// only contain a master key and a self signing key, meaning that only device
/// signatures can be checked with this identity.
///
/// This struct also contains the currently pinned user identity (public master
/// key) for that user and a local flag that serves as a latch to remember if an
/// identity was verified once.
///
/// The first time a cryptographic user identity is seen for a given user, it
/// will be associated with that user ("pinned"). Future interactions
/// will expect this identity to stay the same, to avoid MITM attacks from the
/// homeserver.
///
/// The user can explicitly pin the new identity to allow for legitimate
/// identity changes (for example, in case of key material or device loss).
///
/// As soon as the cryptographic identity is verified (i.e. signed by our own
/// trusted identity), a flag is set to remember it (`previously_verified`).
/// Future interactions will expect this user to stay verified, in case of
/// violation the user should be notified with a blocking warning when sending a
/// message.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(try_from = "OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer", into = "OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer")]
pub struct OtherUserIdentityData {
user_id: OwnedUserId,
pub(crate) master_key: Arc<MasterPubkey>,
self_signing_key: Arc<SelfSigningPubkey>,
pinned_master_key: Arc<RwLock<MasterPubkey>>,
/// This tracks whether this olm machine has already seen this user as
/// verified. To use it in the future to detect cases where the user has
/// become unverified for any reason. This can be reset using
/// [`OtherUserIdentityData::withdraw_verification()`].
previously_verified: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
/// Intermediate struct to help serialize OtherUserIdentityData and support
/// versioning and migration.
///
/// Version v1 is adding support for identity pinning (`pinned_master_key`), as
/// part of migration we just pin the currently known public master key.
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer {
version: Option<String>,
#[serde(flatten)]
other: Value,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV0 {
user_id: OwnedUserId,
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV1 {
user_id: OwnedUserId,
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
pinned_master_key: MasterPubkey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV2 {
user_id: OwnedUserId,
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
pinned_master_key: MasterPubkey,
previously_verified: bool,
}
impl TryFrom<OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer> for OtherUserIdentityData {
type Error = serde_json::Error;
fn try_from(
value: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer,
) -> Result<OtherUserIdentityData, Self::Error> {
match value.version {
None => {
// Old format, migrate the pinned identity
let v0: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV0 = serde_json::from_value(value.other)?;
Ok(OtherUserIdentityData {
user_id: v0.user_id,
master_key: Arc::new(v0.master_key.clone()),
self_signing_key: Arc::new(v0.self_signing_key),
// We migrate by pinning the current master key
pinned_master_key: Arc::new(RwLock::new(v0.master_key)),
previously_verified: Arc::new(false.into()),
})
}
Some(v) if v == "1" => {
let v1: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV1 = serde_json::from_value(value.other)?;
Ok(OtherUserIdentityData {
user_id: v1.user_id,
master_key: Arc::new(v1.master_key.clone()),
self_signing_key: Arc::new(v1.self_signing_key),
pinned_master_key: Arc::new(RwLock::new(v1.pinned_master_key)),
// Put it to false. There will be a migration to mark all users as dirty, so we
// will receive an update for the identity that will correctly set up the value.
previously_verified: Arc::new(false.into()),
})
}
Some(v) if v == "2" => {
let v2: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV2 = serde_json::from_value(value.other)?;
Ok(OtherUserIdentityData {
user_id: v2.user_id,
master_key: Arc::new(v2.master_key.clone()),
self_signing_key: Arc::new(v2.self_signing_key),
pinned_master_key: Arc::new(RwLock::new(v2.pinned_master_key)),
previously_verified: Arc::new(v2.previously_verified.into()),
})
}
_ => Err(serde::de::Error::custom(format!("Unsupported Version {:?}", value.version))),
}
}
}
impl From<OtherUserIdentityData> for OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer {
fn from(value: OtherUserIdentityData) -> Self {
let v2 = OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV2 {
user_id: value.user_id.clone(),
master_key: value.master_key().to_owned(),
self_signing_key: value.self_signing_key().to_owned(),
pinned_master_key: value.pinned_master_key.read().unwrap().clone(),
previously_verified: value.previously_verified.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
};
OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer {
version: Some("2".to_owned()),
other: serde_json::to_value(v2).unwrap(),
}
}
}
impl PartialEq for OtherUserIdentityData {
/// The `PartialEq` implementation compares several attributes, including
/// the user ID, key material, usage, and, notably, the signatures of
/// the master key.
///
/// This approach contrasts with the `PartialEq` implementation of the
/// [`MasterPubkey`], and [`SelfSigningPubkey`] types,
/// where the signatures are disregarded. This distinction arises from our
/// treatment of identity as the combined representation of cross-signing
/// keys and the associated verification state.
///
/// The verification state of an identity depends on the signatures of the
/// master key, requiring their inclusion in our `PartialEq` implementation.
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.user_id == other.user_id
&& self.master_key == other.master_key
&& self.self_signing_key == other.self_signing_key
&& self.master_key.signatures() == other.master_key.signatures()
}
}
impl OtherUserIdentityData {
/// Create a new user identity with the given master and self signing key.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `master_key` - The master key of the user identity.
///
/// * `self signing key` - The self signing key of user identity.
///
/// Returns a `SignatureError` if the self signing key fails to be correctly
/// verified by the given master key.
pub(crate) fn new(
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
) -> Result<Self, SignatureError> {
master_key.verify_subkey(&self_signing_key)?;
Ok(Self {
user_id: master_key.user_id().into(),
master_key: master_key.clone().into(),
self_signing_key: self_signing_key.into(),
pinned_master_key: RwLock::new(master_key).into(),
previously_verified: Arc::new(false.into()),
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn from_private(identity: &crate::olm::PrivateCrossSigningIdentity) -> Self {
let master_key = identity.master_key.lock().await.as_ref().unwrap().public_key().clone();
let self_signing_key =
identity.self_signing_key.lock().await.as_ref().unwrap().public_key().clone().into();
Self {
user_id: identity.user_id().into(),
master_key: Arc::new(master_key.clone()),
self_signing_key,
pinned_master_key: Arc::new(RwLock::new(master_key.clone())),
previously_verified: Arc::new(false.into()),
}
}
/// Get the user id of this identity.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
&self.user_id
}
/// Get the public master key of the identity.
pub fn master_key(&self) -> &MasterPubkey {
&self.master_key
}
/// Get the public self-signing key of the identity.
pub fn self_signing_key(&self) -> &SelfSigningPubkey {
&self.self_signing_key
}
/// Remember this identity, ensuring it does not result in a pin violation.
///
/// When we first see a user, we assume their cryptographic identity has not
/// been tampered with by the homeserver or another entity with
/// man-in-the-middle capabilities. We remember this identity and call this
/// action "pinning".
///
/// If the identity presented for the user changes later on, the newly
/// presented identity is considered to be in "pin violation". This
/// method explicitly accepts the new identity, allowing it to replace
/// the previously pinned one and bringing it out of pin violation.
///
/// UIs should display a warning to the user when encountering an identity
/// which is not verified and is in pin violation. See
/// [`OtherUserIdentity::identity_needs_user_approval`].
pub(crate) fn pin(&self) {
let mut m = self.pinned_master_key.write().unwrap();
*m = self.master_key.as_ref().clone()
}
/// Remember that this identity used to be verified at some point.
pub(crate) fn mark_as_previously_verified(&self) {
self.previously_verified.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst)
}
/// True if we verified this identity (with any own identity, at any
/// point).
///
/// To set this latch back to false, call
/// [`OtherUserIdentityData::withdraw_verification()`].
pub fn was_previously_verified(&self) -> bool {
self.previously_verified.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
}
/// Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified.
///
/// If an identity was previously verified and is not anymore it will be
/// reported to the user. In order to remove this notice users have to
/// verify again or to withdraw the verification requirement.
pub fn withdraw_verification(&self) {
self.previously_verified.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst)
}
/// Returns true if the identity has changed since we last pinned it.
///
/// Key pinning acts as a trust on first use mechanism: the first time an
/// identity is known for a user it will be pinned.
///
/// For future interaction with a user, the identity is expected to be the
/// one that was pinned. In case of identity change the UI client should
/// receive reports of pinning violation and decide to act accordingly:
/// accept and pin the new identity, perform a verification, or
/// stop communications.
pub(crate) fn has_pin_violation(&self) -> bool {
let pinned_master_key = self.pinned_master_key.read().unwrap();
pinned_master_key.get_first_key() != self.master_key().get_first_key()
}
/// Update the identity with a new master key and self signing key.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `master_key` - The new master key of the user identity.
///
/// * `self_signing_key` - The new self signing key of user identity.
///
/// * `maybe_verified_own_user_signing_key` - Our own user_signing_key if it
/// is verified to check the identity trust status after update.
///
/// Returns a `SignatureError` if we failed to update the identity.
/// Otherwise, returns `true` if there was a change to the identity and
/// `false` if the identity is unchanged.
pub(crate) fn update(
&mut self,
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
maybe_verified_own_user_signing_key: Option<&UserSigningPubkey>,
) -> Result<bool, SignatureError> {
master_key.verify_subkey(&self_signing_key)?;
// We update the identity with the new master and self signing key, but we keep
// the previous pinned master key.
// This identity will have a pin violation until the new master key is pinned
// (see `has_pin_violation()`).
let pinned_master_key = self.pinned_master_key.read().unwrap().clone();
// Check if the new master_key is signed by our own **verified**
// user_signing_key. If the identity was verified we remember it.
let updated_is_verified = maybe_verified_own_user_signing_key
.map_or(false, |own_user_signing_key| {
own_user_signing_key.verify_master_key(&master_key).is_ok()
});
let new = Self {
user_id: master_key.user_id().into(),
master_key: master_key.clone().into(),
self_signing_key: self_signing_key.into(),
pinned_master_key: RwLock::new(pinned_master_key).into(),
previously_verified: Arc::new(
(self.was_previously_verified() || updated_is_verified).into(),
),
};
let changed = new != *self;
*self = new;
Ok(changed)
}
/// Check if the given device has been signed by this identity.
///
/// The user_id of the user identity and the user_id of the device need to
/// match for the signature check to succeed as we don't trust users to sign
/// devices of other users.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `device` - The device that should be checked for a valid signature.
///
/// Returns `true` if the signature check succeeded, otherwise `false`.
pub(crate) fn is_device_signed(&self, device: &DeviceData) -> bool {
self.user_id() == device.user_id() && self.self_signing_key.verify_device(device).is_ok()
}
}
/// Struct representing a cross signing identity of our own user.
///
/// This is the user identity of our own user. This user identity will contain a
/// master key, self signing key as well as a user signing key.
///
/// This identity can verify other identities as well as devices belonging to
/// the identity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct OwnUserIdentityData {
user_id: OwnedUserId,
master_key: Arc<MasterPubkey>,
self_signing_key: Arc<SelfSigningPubkey>,
user_signing_key: Arc<UserSigningPubkey>,
#[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_own_user_identity_data_verified")]
verified: Arc<RwLock<OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState>>,
}
#[derive(Default, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState {
/// We have never verified our own identity
#[default]
NeverVerified,
/// We previously verified this identity, but it has changed.
VerificationViolation,
/// We have verified the current identity.
Verified,
}
impl PartialEq for OwnUserIdentityData {
/// The `PartialEq` implementation compares several attributes, including
/// the user ID, key material, usage, and, notably, the signatures of
/// the master key.
///
/// This approach contrasts with the `PartialEq` implementation of the
/// [`MasterPubkey`], [`SelfSigningPubkey`] and [`UserSigningPubkey`] types,
/// where the signatures are disregarded. This distinction arises from our
/// treatment of identity as the combined representation of cross-signing
/// keys and the associated verification state.
///
/// The verification state of an identity depends on the signatures of the
/// master key, requiring their inclusion in our `PartialEq` implementation.
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.user_id == other.user_id
&& self.master_key == other.master_key
&& self.self_signing_key == other.self_signing_key
&& self.user_signing_key == other.user_signing_key
&& *self.verified.read().unwrap() == *other.verified.read().unwrap()
&& self.master_key.signatures() == other.master_key.signatures()
}
}
impl OwnUserIdentityData {
/// Create a new own user identity with the given master, self signing, and
/// user signing key.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `master_key` - The master key of the user identity.
///
/// * `self_signing_key` - The self signing key of user identity.
///
/// * `user_signing_key` - The user signing key of user identity.
///
/// Returns a `SignatureError` if the self signing key fails to be correctly
/// verified by the given master key.
pub(crate) fn new(
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
user_signing_key: UserSigningPubkey,
) -> Result<Self, SignatureError> {
master_key.verify_subkey(&self_signing_key)?;
master_key.verify_subkey(&user_signing_key)?;
Ok(Self {
user_id: master_key.user_id().into(),
master_key: master_key.into(),
self_signing_key: self_signing_key.into(),
user_signing_key: user_signing_key.into(),
verified: Default::default(),
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn from_private(identity: &crate::olm::PrivateCrossSigningIdentity) -> Self {
let master_key = identity.master_key.lock().await.as_ref().unwrap().public_key().clone();
let self_signing_key =
identity.self_signing_key.lock().await.as_ref().unwrap().public_key().clone();
let user_signing_key =
identity.user_signing_key.lock().await.as_ref().unwrap().public_key().clone();
Self {
user_id: identity.user_id().into(),
master_key: master_key.into(),
self_signing_key: self_signing_key.into(),
user_signing_key: user_signing_key.into(),
verified: Default::default(),
}
}
/// Get the user id of this identity.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
&self.user_id
}
/// Get the public master key of the identity.
pub fn master_key(&self) -> &MasterPubkey {
&self.master_key
}
/// Get the public self-signing key of the identity.
pub fn self_signing_key(&self) -> &SelfSigningPubkey {
&self.self_signing_key
}
/// Get the public user-signing key of the identity.
pub fn user_signing_key(&self) -> &UserSigningPubkey {
&self.user_signing_key
}
/// Check if the given user identity has been verified.
///
/// The identity of another user is verified iff our own identity is
/// verified and if our own identity has signed the other user's
/// identity.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `identity` - The identity of another user which we want to check has
/// been verified.
pub fn is_identity_verified(&self, identity: &OtherUserIdentityData) -> bool {
self.is_verified() && self.is_identity_signed(identity)
}
/// Check if the given identity has been signed by this identity.
///
/// Note that, normally, you'll also want to check that the
/// `OwnUserIdentityData` has been verified; for that,
/// [`Self::is_identity_verified`] is more appropriate.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `identity` - The identity of another user that we want to check if it
/// has been signed.
///
/// Returns `true` if the signature check succeeded, otherwise `false`.
pub(crate) fn is_identity_signed(&self, identity: &OtherUserIdentityData) -> bool {
self.user_signing_key.verify_master_key(&identity.master_key).is_ok()
}
/// Check if the given device has been signed by this identity.
///
/// Only devices of our own user should be checked with this method. If a
/// device of a different user is given, the signature check will always
/// fail even if a valid signature exists.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `device` - The device that should be checked for a valid signature.
///
/// Returns `true` if the signature check succeeded, otherwise `false`.
pub(crate) fn is_device_signed(&self, device: &DeviceData) -> bool {
self.user_id() == device.user_id() && self.self_signing_key.verify_device(device).is_ok()
}
/// Mark our identity as verified.
pub fn mark_as_verified(&self) {
*self.verified.write().unwrap() = OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified;
}
/// Mark our identity as unverified.
pub(crate) fn mark_as_unverified(&self) {
let mut guard = self.verified.write().unwrap();
if *guard == OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified {
*guard = OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::VerificationViolation;
}
}
/// Check if our identity is verified.
pub fn is_verified(&self) -> bool {
*self.verified.read().unwrap() == OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified
}
/// True if we verified our own identity at some point in the past.
///
/// To reset this latch back to `false`, one must call
/// [`OwnUserIdentityData::withdraw_verification()`].
pub fn was_previously_verified(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
*self.verified.read().unwrap(),
OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified
| OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::VerificationViolation
)
}
/// Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified.
///
/// If an identity was previously verified and is not any more it will be
/// reported to the user. In order to remove this notice users have to
/// verify again or to withdraw the verification requirement.
pub fn withdraw_verification(&self) {
let mut guard = self.verified.write().unwrap();
if *guard == OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::VerificationViolation {
*guard = OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::NeverVerified;
}
}
/// Was this identity previously verified, and is no longer?
///
/// Such a violation should be reported to the local user by the
/// application, and resolved by
///
/// - Verifying the new identity with
/// [`OwnUserIdentity::request_verification`]
/// - Or by withdrawing the verification requirement
/// [`OwnUserIdentity::withdraw_verification`].
pub fn has_verification_violation(&self) -> bool {
*self.verified.read().unwrap() == OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::VerificationViolation
}
/// Update the identity with a new master key and self signing key.
///
/// Note: This will reset the verification state if the master keys differ.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `master_key` - The new master key of the user identity.
///
/// * `self_signing_key` - The new self signing key of user identity.
///
/// * `user_signing_key` - The new user signing key of user identity.
///
/// Returns a `SignatureError` if we failed to update the identity.
/// Otherwise, returns `true` if there was a change to the identity and
/// `false` if the identity is unchanged.
pub(crate) fn update(
&mut self,
master_key: MasterPubkey,
self_signing_key: SelfSigningPubkey,
user_signing_key: UserSigningPubkey,
) -> Result<bool, SignatureError> {
master_key.verify_subkey(&self_signing_key)?;
master_key.verify_subkey(&user_signing_key)?;
let old = self.clone();
self.self_signing_key = self_signing_key.into();
self.user_signing_key = user_signing_key.into();
if self.master_key.as_ref() != &master_key {
self.mark_as_unverified()
}
self.master_key = master_key.into();
Ok(old != *self)
}
fn filter_devices_to_request(
&self,
devices: HashMap<OwnedDeviceId, DeviceData>,
own_device_id: &DeviceId,
) -> Vec<OwnedDeviceId> {
devices
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(device_id, device)| {
(device_id != own_device_id && self.is_device_signed(&device)).then_some(device_id)
})
.collect()
}
}
/// Custom deserializer for [`OwnUserIdentityData::verified`].
///
/// This used to be a bool, so we need to handle that.
fn deserialize_own_user_identity_data_verified<'de, D>(
de: D,
) -> Result<Arc<RwLock<OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState>>, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
enum VerifiedStateOrBool {
VerifiedState(OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState),
Bool(bool),
}
let verified_state = match VerifiedStateOrBool::deserialize(de)? {
VerifiedStateOrBool::Bool(true) => OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified,
VerifiedStateOrBool::Bool(false) => OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::NeverVerified,
VerifiedStateOrBool::VerifiedState(x) => x,
};
Ok(Arc::new(RwLock::new(verified_state)))
}
/// Testing Facilities
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "testing"))]
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) mod testing {
use matrix_sdk_test::ruma_response_from_json;
use ruma::{
api::client::keys::{
get_keys::v3::Response as KeyQueryResponse,
upload_signatures::v3::Request as SignatureUploadRequest,
},
user_id, UserId,
};
use serde_json::json;
use super::{OtherUserIdentityData, OwnUserIdentity, OwnUserIdentityData};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::{identities::manager::testing::other_user_id, olm::PrivateCrossSigningIdentity};
use crate::{
identities::{
manager::testing::{other_key_query, own_key_query},
DeviceData,
},
store::Store,
types::CrossSigningKey,
verification::VerificationMachine,
};
/// Generate test devices from KeyQueryResponse
pub fn device(response: &KeyQueryResponse) -> (DeviceData, DeviceData) {
let mut devices = response.device_keys.values().next().unwrap().values();
let first =
DeviceData::try_from(&devices.next().unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap()).unwrap();
let second =
DeviceData::try_from(&devices.next().unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap()).unwrap();
(first, second)
}
/// Generate [`OwnUserIdentityData`] from a [`KeyQueryResponse`] for testing
pub fn own_identity(response: &KeyQueryResponse) -> OwnUserIdentityData {
let user_id = user_id!("@example:localhost");
let master_key: CrossSigningKey =
response.master_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let user_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.user_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let self_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.self_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
OwnUserIdentityData::new(
master_key.try_into().unwrap(),
self_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
user_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
)
.unwrap()
}
/// Generate default own identity for tests
pub fn get_own_identity() -> OwnUserIdentityData {
own_identity(&own_key_query())
}
pub fn own_identity_wrapped(
inner: OwnUserIdentityData,
verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
store: Store,
) -> OwnUserIdentity {
OwnUserIdentity { inner, verification_machine, store }
}
/// Generate default other "own" identity for tests
#[cfg(test)]
pub async fn get_other_own_identity() -> OwnUserIdentityData {
let private_identity = PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::new(other_user_id().into());
OwnUserIdentityData::from_private(&private_identity).await
}
/// Generate default other identify for tests
pub fn get_other_identity() -> OtherUserIdentityData {
let user_id = user_id!("@example2:localhost");
let response = other_key_query();
let master_key: CrossSigningKey =
response.master_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let self_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.self_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
OtherUserIdentityData::new(master_key.try_into().unwrap(), self_signing.try_into().unwrap())
.unwrap()
}
/// When we want to test identities that are verified, we need to simulate
/// the verification process. This function supports that by simulating
/// what happens when a successful verification dance happens and
/// providing the /keys/query response we would get when that happened.
///
/// signature_upload_request will be the result of calling
/// [`super::OtherUserIdentity::verify`].
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```ignore
/// let signature_upload_request = their_identity.verify().await.unwrap();
///
/// let msk_json = json!({
/// "their_user_id": {
/// "keys": { "ed25519:blah": "blah" }
/// "signatures": {
/// "their_user_id": { "ed25519:blah": "blah", ... }
/// }
/// "usage": [ "master" ],
/// "user_id": "their_user_id"
/// }
/// });
///
/// let ssk_json = json!({
/// "their_user_id": {
/// "keys": { "ed25519:blah": "blah" },
/// "signatures": {
/// "their_user_id": { "ed25519:blah": "blah" }
/// },
/// "usage": [ "self_signing" ],
/// "user_id": "their_user_id"
/// }
/// })
///
/// let response = simulate_key_query_response_for_verification(
/// signature_upload_request,
/// my_identity,
/// my_user_id,
/// their_user_id,
/// msk_json,
/// ssk_json
/// ).await;
///
/// olm_machine
/// .mark_request_as_sent(
/// &TransactionId::new(),
/// crate::IncomingResponse::KeysQuery(&kq_response),
/// )
/// .await
/// .unwrap();
/// ```
pub fn simulate_key_query_response_for_verification(
signature_upload_request: SignatureUploadRequest,
my_identity: OwnUserIdentity,
my_user_id: &UserId,
their_user_id: &UserId,
msk_json: serde_json::Value,
ssk_json: serde_json::Value,
) -> KeyQueryResponse {
// Find the signed key inside the SignatureUploadRequest
let cross_signing_key: CrossSigningKey = serde_json::from_str(
signature_upload_request
.signed_keys
.get(their_user_id)
.expect("Signature upload request should contain a key for their user ID")
.iter()
.next()
.expect("There should be a key in the signature upload request")
.1
.get(),
)
.expect("Should not fail to deserialize the key");
// Find their master key that we want to update inside their msk JSON
let mut their_msk: CrossSigningKey = serde_json::from_value(
msk_json.get(their_user_id.as_str()).expect("msk should contain their user ID").clone(),
)
.expect("Should not fail to deserialize msk");
// Find our own user signing key
let my_user_signing_key_id = my_identity
.user_signing_key()
.keys()
.iter()
.next()
.expect("There should be a user signing key")
.0;
// Add the signature from the SignatureUploadRequest to their master key, under
// our user ID
their_msk.signatures.add_signature(
my_user_id.to_owned(),
my_user_signing_key_id.to_owned(),
cross_signing_key
.signatures
.get_signature(my_user_id, my_user_signing_key_id)
.expect("There should be a signature for our user"),
);
// Create a JSON response as if the verification has happened
ruma_response_from_json(&json!({
"device_keys": {}, // Don't need devices here, even though they would exist
"failures": {},
"master_keys": {
their_user_id: their_msk,
},
"self_signing_keys": ssk_json,
}))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests {
use std::{collections::HashMap, sync::Arc};
use assert_matches::assert_matches;
use matrix_sdk_test::{async_test, test_json};
use ruma::{device_id, user_id, TransactionId};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use super::{
testing::{device, get_other_identity, get_own_identity},
OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV2, OwnUserIdentityData, OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState,
UserIdentityData,
};
use crate::{
identities::{
manager::testing::own_key_query,
user::{
testing::simulate_key_query_response_for_verification,
OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer,
},
Device,
},
olm::{Account, PrivateCrossSigningIdentity},
store::{CryptoStoreWrapper, MemoryStore},
types::{CrossSigningKey, MasterPubkey, SelfSigningPubkey, Signatures, UserSigningPubkey},
verification::VerificationMachine,
CrossSigningKeyExport, OlmMachine, OtherUserIdentityData,
};
#[test]
fn own_identity_create() {
let user_id = user_id!("@example:localhost");
let response = own_key_query();
let master_key: CrossSigningKey =
response.master_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let user_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.user_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let self_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.self_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
OwnUserIdentityData::new(
master_key.try_into().unwrap(),
self_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
user_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn own_identity_partial_equality() {
let user_id = user_id!("@example:localhost");
let response = own_key_query();
let master_key: CrossSigningKey =
response.master_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let user_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.user_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let self_signing: CrossSigningKey =
response.self_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap().deserialize_as().unwrap();
let identity = OwnUserIdentityData::new(
master_key.clone().try_into().unwrap(),
self_signing.clone().try_into().unwrap(),
user_signing.clone().try_into().unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
let mut master_key_updated_signature = master_key;
master_key_updated_signature.signatures = Signatures::new();
let updated_identity = OwnUserIdentityData::new(
master_key_updated_signature.try_into().unwrap(),
self_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
user_signing.try_into().unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(identity, updated_identity);
assert_eq!(identity.master_key(), updated_identity.master_key());
}
#[test]
fn other_identity_create() {
get_other_identity();
}
#[test]
fn deserialization_migration_test() {
let serialized_value = json!({
"user_id":"@example2:localhost",
"master_key":{
"user_id":"@example2:localhost",
"usage":[
"master"
],
"keys":{
"ed25519:kC/HmRYw4HNqUp/i4BkwYENrf+hd9tvdB7A1YOf5+Do":"kC/HmRYw4HNqUp/i4BkwYENrf+hd9tvdB7A1YOf5+Do"
},
"signatures":{
"@example2:localhost":{
"ed25519:SKISMLNIMH":"KdUZqzt8VScGNtufuQ8lOf25byYLWIhmUYpPENdmM8nsldexD7vj+Sxoo7PknnTX/BL9h2N7uBq0JuykjunCAw"
}
}
},
"self_signing_key":{
"user_id":"@example2:localhost",
"usage":[
"self_signing"
],
"keys":{
"ed25519:ZtFrSkJ1qB8Jph/ql9Eo/lKpIYCzwvKAKXfkaS4XZNc":"ZtFrSkJ1qB8Jph/ql9Eo/lKpIYCzwvKAKXfkaS4XZNc"
},
"signatures":{
"@example2:localhost":{
"ed25519:kC/HmRYw4HNqUp/i4BkwYENrf+hd9tvdB7A1YOf5+Do":"W/O8BnmiUETPpH02mwYaBgvvgF/atXnusmpSTJZeUSH/vHg66xiZOhveQDG4cwaW8iMa+t9N4h1DWnRoHB4mCQ"
}
}
}
});
let migrated: OtherUserIdentityData = serde_json::from_value(serialized_value).unwrap();
let pinned_master_key = migrated.pinned_master_key.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(*pinned_master_key, migrated.master_key().clone());
// Serialize back
let value = serde_json::to_value(migrated.clone()).unwrap();
// Should be serialized with latest version
let _: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializerV2 =
serde_json::from_value(value.clone()).expect("Should deserialize as version 2");
let with_serializer: OtherUserIdentityDataSerializer =
serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap();
assert_eq!("2", with_serializer.version.unwrap());
}
/// [`OwnUserIdentityData::verified`] was previously an AtomicBool. Check
/// that we can deserialize boolean values.
#[test]
fn test_deserialize_own_user_identity_bool_verified() {
let mut json = json!({
"user_id": "@example:localhost",
"master_key": {
"user_id":"@example:localhost",
"usage":["master"],
"keys":{"ed25519:rJ2TAGkEOP6dX41Ksll6cl8K3J48l8s/59zaXyvl2p0":"rJ2TAGkEOP6dX41Ksll6cl8K3J48l8s/59zaXyvl2p0"},
},
"self_signing_key": {
"user_id":"@example:localhost",
"usage":["self_signing"],
"keys":{"ed25519:0C8lCBxrvrv/O7BQfsKnkYogHZX3zAgw3RfJuyiq210":"0C8lCBxrvrv/O7BQfsKnkYogHZX3zAgw3RfJuyiq210"}
},
"user_signing_key": {
"user_id":"@example:localhost",
"usage":["user_signing"],
"keys":{"ed25519:DU9z4gBFKFKCk7a13sW9wjT0Iyg7Hqv5f0BPM7DEhPo":"DU9z4gBFKFKCk7a13sW9wjT0Iyg7Hqv5f0BPM7DEhPo"}
},
"verified": false
});
let id: OwnUserIdentityData = serde_json::from_value(json.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(*id.verified.read().unwrap(), OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::NeverVerified);
// Tweak the json to have `"verified": true`, and repeat
*json.get_mut("verified").unwrap() = true.into();
let id: OwnUserIdentityData = serde_json::from_value(json.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(*id.verified.read().unwrap(), OwnUserIdentityVerifiedState::Verified);
}
#[test]
fn own_identity_check_signatures() {
let response = own_key_query();
let identity = get_own_identity();
let (first, second) = device(&response);
assert!(!identity.is_device_signed(&first));
assert!(identity.is_device_signed(&second));
let private_identity =
Arc::new(Mutex::new(PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(second.user_id())));
let verification_machine = VerificationMachine::new(
Account::with_device_id(second.user_id(), second.device_id()).static_data,
private_identity,
Arc::new(CryptoStoreWrapper::new(
second.user_id(),
second.device_id(),
MemoryStore::new(),
)),
);
let first = Device {
inner: first,
verification_machine: verification_machine.clone(),
own_identity: Some(identity.clone()),
device_owner_identity: Some(UserIdentityData::Own(identity.clone())),
};
let second = Device {
inner: second,
verification_machine,
own_identity: Some(identity.clone()),
device_owner_identity: Some(UserIdentityData::Own(identity.clone())),
};
assert!(!second.is_locally_trusted());
assert!(!second.is_cross_signing_trusted());
assert!(!first.is_locally_trusted());
assert!(!first.is_cross_signing_trusted());
identity.mark_as_verified();
assert!(second.is_verified());
assert!(!first.is_verified());
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_own_device_with_private_identity() {
let response = own_key_query();
let (_, device) = device(&response);
let account = Account::with_device_id(device.user_id(), device.device_id());
let (identity, _, _) = PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::with_account(&account).await;
let id = Arc::new(Mutex::new(identity.clone()));
let verification_machine = VerificationMachine::new(
Account::with_device_id(device.user_id(), device.device_id()).static_data,
id.clone(),
Arc::new(CryptoStoreWrapper::new(
device.user_id(),
device.device_id(),
MemoryStore::new(),
)),
);
let public_identity = identity.to_public_identity().await.unwrap();
let mut device = Device {
inner: device,
verification_machine: verification_machine.clone(),
own_identity: Some(public_identity.clone()),
device_owner_identity: Some(public_identity.clone().into()),
};
assert!(!device.is_verified());
let mut device_keys = device.as_device_keys().to_owned();
identity.sign_device_keys(&mut device_keys).await.unwrap();
device.inner.update_device(&device_keys).expect("Couldn't update newly signed device keys");
assert!(device.is_verified());
}
/// Test that `CrossSigningKey` instances without a correct `usage` cannot
/// be deserialized into high-level structs representing the MSK, SSK
/// and USK.
#[test]
fn cannot_instantiate_keys_with_incorrect_usage() {
let user_id = user_id!("@example:localhost");
let response = own_key_query();
let master_key = response.master_keys.get(user_id).unwrap();
let mut master_key_json: Value = master_key.deserialize_as().unwrap();
let self_signing_key = response.self_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap();
let mut self_signing_key_json: Value = self_signing_key.deserialize_as().unwrap();
let user_signing_key = response.user_signing_keys.get(user_id).unwrap();
let mut user_signing_key_json: Value = user_signing_key.deserialize_as().unwrap();
// Delete the usages.
let usage = master_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!([]);
let usage = self_signing_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!([]);
let usage = user_signing_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!([]);
// It should now be impossible to deserialize the keys into their corresponding
// high-level cross-signing key structs.
assert_matches!(serde_json::from_value::<MasterPubkey>(master_key_json.clone()), Err(_));
assert_matches!(
serde_json::from_value::<SelfSigningPubkey>(self_signing_key_json.clone()),
Err(_)
);
assert_matches!(
serde_json::from_value::<UserSigningPubkey>(user_signing_key_json.clone()),
Err(_)
);
// Add additional usages.
let usage = master_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!(["master", "user_signing"]);
let usage = self_signing_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!(["self_signing", "user_signing"]);
let usage = user_signing_key_json.get_mut("usage").unwrap();
*usage = json!(["user_signing", "self_signing"]);
// It should still be impossible to deserialize the keys into their
// corresponding high-level cross-signing key structs.
assert_matches!(serde_json::from_value::<MasterPubkey>(master_key_json.clone()), Err(_));
assert_matches!(
serde_json::from_value::<SelfSigningPubkey>(self_signing_key_json.clone()),
Err(_)
);
assert_matches!(
serde_json::from_value::<UserSigningPubkey>(user_signing_key_json.clone()),
Err(_)
);
}
#[test]
fn filter_devices_to_request() {
let response = own_key_query();
let identity = get_own_identity();
let (first, second) = device(&response);
let second_device_id = second.device_id().to_owned();
let unknown_device_id = device_id!("UNKNOWN");
let devices = HashMap::from([
(first.device_id().to_owned(), first),
(second.device_id().to_owned(), second),
]);
// Own device and devices not verified are filtered out.
assert_eq!(identity.filter_devices_to_request(devices.clone(), &second_device_id).len(), 0);
// Signed devices that are not our own are kept.
assert_eq!(
identity.filter_devices_to_request(devices, unknown_device_id),
[second_device_id]
);
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_resolve_identity_pin_violation_with_verification() {
use test_json::keys_query_sets::IdentityChangeDataSet as DataSet;
let my_user_id = user_id!("@me:localhost");
let machine = OlmMachine::new(my_user_id, device_id!("ABCDEFGH")).await;
machine.bootstrap_cross_signing(false).await.unwrap();
let my_id = machine.get_identity(my_user_id, None).await.unwrap().unwrap().own().unwrap();
let keys_query = DataSet::key_query_with_identity_a();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
// Simulate an identity change
let keys_query = DataSet::key_query_with_identity_b();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
let other_user_id = DataSet::user_id();
let other_identity =
machine.get_identity(other_user_id, None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
// The identity should need user approval now
assert!(other_identity.identity_needs_user_approval());
// Manually verify for the purpose of this test
let sig_upload = other_identity.verify().await.unwrap();
let kq_response = simulate_key_query_response_for_verification(
sig_upload,
my_id,
my_user_id,
other_user_id,
DataSet::master_signing_keys_b(),
DataSet::self_signing_keys_b(),
);
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&TransactionId::new(), &kq_response).await.unwrap();
// The identity should not need any user approval now
let other_identity =
machine.get_identity(other_user_id, None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
assert!(!other_identity.identity_needs_user_approval());
// But there is still a pin violation
assert!(other_identity.inner.has_pin_violation());
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_resolve_identity_verification_violation_with_withdraw() {
use test_json::keys_query_sets::VerificationViolationTestData as DataSet;
let machine = OlmMachine::new(DataSet::own_id(), device_id!("LOCAL")).await;
let keys_query = DataSet::own_keys_query_response_1();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
machine
.import_cross_signing_keys(CrossSigningKeyExport {
master_key: DataSet::MASTER_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
self_signing_key: DataSet::SELF_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
user_signing_key: DataSet::USER_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let keys_query = DataSet::bob_keys_query_response_rotated();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
let bob_identity =
machine.get_identity(DataSet::bob_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
// For testing purpose mark it as previously verified
bob_identity.mark_as_previously_verified().await.unwrap();
assert!(bob_identity.has_verification_violation());
// withdraw
bob_identity.withdraw_verification().await.unwrap();
let bob_identity =
machine.get_identity(DataSet::bob_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
assert!(!bob_identity.has_verification_violation());
}
#[async_test]
async fn test_reset_own_keys_creates_verification_violation() {
use test_json::keys_query_sets::VerificationViolationTestData as DataSet;
let machine = OlmMachine::new(DataSet::own_id(), device_id!("LOCAL")).await;
let keys_query = DataSet::own_keys_query_response_1();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
machine
.import_cross_signing_keys(CrossSigningKeyExport {
master_key: DataSet::MASTER_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
self_signing_key: DataSet::SELF_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
user_signing_key: DataSet::USER_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let keys_query = DataSet::bob_keys_query_response_signed();
let txn_id = TransactionId::new();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&txn_id, &keys_query).await.unwrap();
let bob_identity =
machine.get_identity(DataSet::bob_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
// For testing purpose mark it as previously verified
bob_identity.mark_as_previously_verified().await.unwrap();
assert!(!bob_identity.has_verification_violation());
let _ = machine.bootstrap_cross_signing(true).await.unwrap();
let bob_identity =
machine.get_identity(DataSet::bob_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap().other().unwrap();
assert!(bob_identity.has_verification_violation());
}
/// Test that receiving new public keys for our own identity causes a
/// verification violation on our own identity.
#[async_test]
async fn test_own_keys_update_creates_own_identity_verification_violation() {
use test_json::keys_query_sets::VerificationViolationTestData as DataSet;
let machine = OlmMachine::new(DataSet::own_id(), device_id!("LOCAL")).await;
// Start with our own identity verified
let own_keys = DataSet::own_keys_query_response_1();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&TransactionId::new(), &own_keys).await.unwrap();
machine
.import_cross_signing_keys(CrossSigningKeyExport {
master_key: DataSet::MASTER_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
self_signing_key: DataSet::SELF_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
user_signing_key: DataSet::USER_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_EXPORT.to_owned().into(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Double-check that we have a verified identity
let own_identity = machine.get_identity(DataSet::own_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert!(own_identity.is_verified());
assert!(own_identity.was_previously_verified());
assert!(!own_identity.has_verification_violation());
// Now, we receive a *different* set of public keys
let own_keys = DataSet::own_keys_query_response_2();
machine.mark_request_as_sent(&TransactionId::new(), &own_keys).await.unwrap();
// That should give an identity that is no longer verified, with a verification
// violation.
let own_identity = machine.get_identity(DataSet::own_id(), None).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert!(!own_identity.is_verified());
assert!(own_identity.was_previously_verified());
assert!(own_identity.has_verification_violation());
// Now check that we can withdraw verification for our own identity, and that it
// becomes valid again.
own_identity.withdraw_verification().await.unwrap();
assert!(!own_identity.is_verified());
assert!(!own_identity.was_previously_verified());
assert!(!own_identity.has_verification_violation());
}
}