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// Copyright 2015-2021 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).
//!
//! See [Authenticated encryption: relations among notions and analysis of the
//! generic composition paradigm][AEAD] for an introduction to the concept of
//! AEADs.
//!
//! [AEAD]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/025.pdf
//! [`crypto.cipher.AEAD`]: https://golang.org/pkg/crypto/cipher/#AEAD
use crate::{
cpu, error, hkdf,
polyfill::{u64_from_usize, usize_from_u64_saturated},
};
use core::ops::RangeFrom;
pub use self::{
aes_gcm::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM},
chacha20_poly1305::CHACHA20_POLY1305,
less_safe_key::LessSafeKey,
nonce::{Nonce, NONCE_LEN},
opening_key::OpeningKey,
sealing_key::SealingKey,
unbound_key::UnboundKey,
};
/// A sequences of unique nonces.
///
/// A given `NonceSequence` must never return the same `Nonce` twice from
/// `advance()`.
///
/// A simple counter is a reasonable (but probably not ideal) `NonceSequence`.
///
/// Intentionally not `Clone` or `Copy` since cloning would allow duplication
/// of the sequence.
pub trait NonceSequence {
/// Returns the next nonce in the sequence.
///
/// This may fail if "too many" nonces have been requested, where how many
/// is too many is up to the implementation of `NonceSequence`. An
/// implementation may that enforce a maximum number of records are
/// sent/received under a key this way. Once `advance()` fails, it must
/// fail for all subsequent calls.
fn advance(&mut self) -> Result<Nonce, error::Unspecified>;
}
/// An AEAD key bound to a nonce sequence.
pub trait BoundKey<N: NonceSequence>: core::fmt::Debug {
/// Constructs a new key from the given `UnboundKey` and `NonceSequence`.
fn new(key: UnboundKey, nonce_sequence: N) -> Self;
/// The key's AEAD algorithm.
fn algorithm(&self) -> &'static Algorithm;
}
/// The additionally authenticated data (AAD) for an opening or sealing
/// operation. This data is authenticated but is **not** encrypted.
///
/// The type `A` could be a byte slice `&[u8]`, a byte array `[u8; N]`
/// for some constant `N`, `Vec<u8>`, etc.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Aad<A>(A);
impl<A: AsRef<[u8]>> Aad<A> {
/// Construct the `Aad` from the given bytes.
#[inline]
pub fn from(aad: A) -> Self {
Self(aad)
}
}
impl<A> AsRef<[u8]> for Aad<A>
where
A: AsRef<[u8]>,
{
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
impl Aad<[u8; 0]> {
/// Construct an empty `Aad`.
pub fn empty() -> Self {
Self::from([])
}
}
impl<A> core::fmt::Debug for Aad<A>
where
A: core::fmt::Debug,
{
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
f.debug_tuple("Aad").field(&self.0).finish()
}
}
impl<A> PartialEq for Aad<A>
where
A: PartialEq,
{
#[inline]
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.0.eq(&other.0)
}
}
impl<A> Eq for Aad<A> where A: Eq {}
#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant, variant_size_differences)]
#[derive(Clone)]
enum KeyInner {
AesGcm(aes_gcm::Key),
ChaCha20Poly1305(chacha20_poly1305::Key),
}
impl hkdf::KeyType for &'static Algorithm {
#[inline]
fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.key_len()
}
}
/// An AEAD Algorithm.
pub struct Algorithm {
init: fn(key: &[u8], cpu_features: cpu::Features) -> Result<KeyInner, error::Unspecified>,
seal: fn(
key: &KeyInner,
nonce: Nonce,
aad: Aad<&[u8]>,
in_out: &mut [u8],
cpu_features: cpu::Features,
) -> Result<Tag, error::Unspecified>,
open: fn(
key: &KeyInner,
nonce: Nonce,
aad: Aad<&[u8]>,
in_out: &mut [u8],
src: RangeFrom<usize>,
cpu_features: cpu::Features,
) -> Result<Tag, error::Unspecified>,
key_len: usize,
id: AlgorithmID,
}
const fn max_input_len(block_len: usize, overhead_blocks_per_nonce: usize) -> usize {
// Each of our AEADs use a 32-bit block counter so the maximum is the
// largest input that will not overflow the counter.
usize_from_u64_saturated(
((1u64 << 32) - u64_from_usize(overhead_blocks_per_nonce)) * u64_from_usize(block_len),
)
}
impl Algorithm {
/// The length of the key.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn key_len(&self) -> usize {
self.key_len
}
/// The length of a tag.
///
/// See also `MAX_TAG_LEN`.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn tag_len(&self) -> usize {
TAG_LEN
}
/// The length of the nonces.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn nonce_len(&self) -> usize {
NONCE_LEN
}
}
derive_debug_via_id!(Algorithm);
#[derive(Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum AlgorithmID {
AES_128_GCM,
AES_256_GCM,
CHACHA20_POLY1305,
}
impl PartialEq for Algorithm {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.id == other.id
}
}
impl Eq for Algorithm {}
/// A possibly valid authentication tag.
#[must_use]
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Tag([u8; TAG_LEN]);
impl AsRef<[u8]> for Tag {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for Tag {
type Error = error::Unspecified;
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let raw_tag: [u8; TAG_LEN] = value.try_into().map_err(|_| error::Unspecified)?;
Ok(Self::from(raw_tag))
}
}
impl From<[u8; TAG_LEN]> for Tag {
#[inline]
fn from(value: [u8; TAG_LEN]) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
const MAX_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
// All the AEADs we support use 128-bit tags.
const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
/// The maximum length of a tag for the algorithms in this module.
pub const MAX_TAG_LEN: usize = TAG_LEN;
mod aes;
mod aes_gcm;
mod block;
mod chacha;
mod chacha20_poly1305;
pub mod chacha20_poly1305_openssh;
mod gcm;
mod less_safe_key;
mod nonce;
mod opening_key;
mod poly1305;
pub mod quic;
mod sealing_key;
mod shift;
mod unbound_key;