pub struct Ed25519KeyPair { /* private fields */ }Expand description
An Ed25519 key pair, for signing.
Implementations§
Source§impl Ed25519KeyPair
impl Ed25519KeyPair
Sourcepub fn generate_pkcs8(rng: &dyn SecureRandom) -> Result<Document, Unspecified>
pub fn generate_pkcs8(rng: &dyn SecureRandom) -> Result<Document, Unspecified>
Generates a new key pair and returns the key pair serialized as a PKCS#8 document.
The PKCS#8 document will be a v2 OneAsymmetricKey with the public key,
as described in RFC 5958 Section 2; see RFC 8410 Section 10.3 for an
example.
Sourcepub fn from_pkcs8(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
pub fn from_pkcs8(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
Constructs an Ed25519 key pair by parsing an unencrypted PKCS#8 v2 Ed25519 private key.
openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519 generates PKCS# v1 keys, which
require the use of Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked()
instead of Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8().
The input must be in PKCS#8 v2 format, and in particular it must contain
the public key in addition to the private key. from_pkcs8() will
verify that the public key and the private key are consistent with each
other.
Some early implementations of PKCS#8 v2, including earlier versions of ring and other implementations, wrapped the public key in the wrong ASN.1 tags. Both that incorrect form and the standardized form are accepted.
If you need to parse PKCS#8 v1 files (without the public key) then use
Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked() instead.
Sourcepub fn from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
pub fn from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
Constructs an Ed25519 key pair by parsing an unencrypted PKCS#8 v1 or v2 Ed25519 private key.
openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519 generates PKCS# v1 keys.
It is recommended to use Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8(), which accepts
only PKCS#8 v2 files that contain the public key.
from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked() parses PKCS#2 files exactly like
from_pkcs8(). It also accepts v1 files. PKCS#8 v1 files do not contain
the public key, so when a v1 file is parsed the public key will be
computed from the private key, and there will be no consistency check
between the public key and the private key.
Some early implementations of PKCS#8 v2, including earlier versions of ring and other implementations, wrapped the public key in the wrong ASN.1 tags. Both that incorrect form and the standardized form are accepted.
PKCS#8 v2 files are parsed exactly like Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8().
Sourcepub fn from_seed_and_public_key(
seed: &[u8],
public_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
pub fn from_seed_and_public_key( seed: &[u8], public_key: &[u8], ) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
Constructs an Ed25519 key pair from the private key seed seed and its
public key public_key.
It is recommended to use Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8() instead.
The private and public keys will be verified to be consistent with each other. This helps avoid misuse of the key (e.g. accidentally swapping the private key and public key, or using the wrong private key for the public key). This also detects any corruption of the public or private key.
Sourcepub fn from_seed_unchecked(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
pub fn from_seed_unchecked(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected>
Constructs a Ed25519 key pair from the private key seed seed.
It is recommended to use Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8() instead. When
that is not practical, it is recommended to use
Ed25519KeyPair::from_seed_and_public_key() instead.
Since the public key is not given, the public key will be computed from the private key. It is not possible to detect misuse or corruption of the private key since the public key isn’t given as input.