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// Copyright 2023 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::{collections::BTreeMap, fmt};
use ruma::{
events::{AnyMessageLikeEvent, AnySyncTimelineEvent, AnyTimelineEvent},
push::Action,
serde::{JsonObject, Raw},
DeviceKeyAlgorithm, OwnedDeviceId, OwnedEventId, OwnedUserId,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*;
use crate::debug::{DebugRawEvent, DebugStructExt};
const AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED: &str =
"The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device.";
const UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY: &str = "Encrypted by an unverified user.";
const VERIFICATION_VIOLATION: &str =
"Encrypted by a previously-verified user who is no longer verified.";
const UNSIGNED_DEVICE: &str = "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner.";
const UNKNOWN_DEVICE: &str = "Encrypted by an unknown or deleted device.";
pub const SENT_IN_CLEAR: &str = "Not encrypted.";
/// Represents the state of verification for a decrypted message sent by a
/// device.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(from = "OldVerificationStateHelper")]
pub enum VerificationState {
/// This message is guaranteed to be authentic as it is coming from a device
/// belonging to a user that we have verified.
///
/// This is the only state where authenticity can be guaranteed.
Verified,
/// The message could not be linked to a verified device.
///
/// For more detailed information on why the message is considered
/// unverified, refer to the VerificationLevel sub-enum.
Unverified(VerificationLevel),
}
// TODO: Remove this once we're confident that everybody that serialized these
// states uses the new enum.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize)]
enum OldVerificationStateHelper {
Untrusted,
UnknownDevice,
#[serde(alias = "Trusted")]
Verified,
Unverified(VerificationLevel),
}
impl From<OldVerificationStateHelper> for VerificationState {
fn from(value: OldVerificationStateHelper) -> Self {
match value {
// This mapping isn't strictly correct but we don't know which part in the old
// `VerificationState` enum was unverified.
OldVerificationStateHelper::Untrusted => {
VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice)
}
OldVerificationStateHelper::UnknownDevice => {
Self::Unverified(VerificationLevel::None(DeviceLinkProblem::MissingDevice))
}
OldVerificationStateHelper::Verified => Self::Verified,
OldVerificationStateHelper::Unverified(l) => Self::Unverified(l),
}
}
}
impl VerificationState {
/// Convert the `VerificationState` into a `ShieldState` which can be
/// directly used to decorate messages in the recommended way.
///
/// This method decorates messages using a strict ruleset, for a more lax
/// variant of this method take a look at
/// [`VerificationState::to_shield_state_lax()`].
pub fn to_shield_state_strict(&self) -> ShieldState {
match self {
VerificationState::Verified => ShieldState::None,
VerificationState::Unverified(level) => match level {
VerificationLevel::UnverifiedIdentity
| VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation
| VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice => ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::UnverifiedIdentity,
message: UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY,
},
VerificationLevel::None(link) => match link {
DeviceLinkProblem::MissingDevice => ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::UnknownDevice,
message: UNKNOWN_DEVICE,
},
DeviceLinkProblem::InsecureSource => ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::AuthenticityNotGuaranteed,
message: AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED,
},
},
},
}
}
/// Convert the `VerificationState` into a `ShieldState` which can be used
/// to decorate messages in the recommended way.
///
/// This implements a legacy, lax decoration mode.
///
/// For a more strict variant of this method take a look at
/// [`VerificationState::to_shield_state_strict()`].
pub fn to_shield_state_lax(&self) -> ShieldState {
match self {
VerificationState::Verified => ShieldState::None,
VerificationState::Unverified(level) => match level {
VerificationLevel::UnverifiedIdentity => {
// If you didn't show interest in verifying that user we don't
// nag you with an error message.
ShieldState::None
}
VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation => {
// This is a high warning. The sender was previously
// verified, but changed their identity.
ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::VerificationViolation,
message: VERIFICATION_VIOLATION,
}
}
VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice => {
// This is a high warning. The sender hasn't verified his own device.
ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::UnsignedDevice,
message: UNSIGNED_DEVICE,
}
}
VerificationLevel::None(link) => match link {
DeviceLinkProblem::MissingDevice => {
// Have to warn as it could have been a temporary injected device.
// Notice that the device might just not be known at this time, so callers
// should retry when there is a device change for that user.
ShieldState::Red {
code: ShieldStateCode::UnknownDevice,
message: UNKNOWN_DEVICE,
}
}
DeviceLinkProblem::InsecureSource => {
// In legacy mode, we tone down this warning as it is quite common and
// mostly noise (due to legacy backup and lack of trusted forwards).
ShieldState::Grey {
code: ShieldStateCode::AuthenticityNotGuaranteed,
message: AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED,
}
}
},
},
}
}
}
/// The sub-enum containing detailed information on why a message is considered
/// to be unverified.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum VerificationLevel {
/// The message was sent by a user identity we have not verified.
UnverifiedIdentity,
/// The message was sent by a user identity we have not verified, but the
/// user was previously verified.
VerificationViolation,
/// The message was sent by a device not linked to (signed by) any user
/// identity.
UnsignedDevice,
/// We weren't able to link the message back to any device. This might be
/// because the message claims to have been sent by a device which we have
/// not been able to obtain (for example, because the device was since
/// deleted) or because the key to decrypt the message was obtained from
/// an insecure source.
None(DeviceLinkProblem),
}
impl fmt::Display for VerificationLevel {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
let display = match self {
VerificationLevel::UnverifiedIdentity => "The sender's identity was not verified",
VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation => {
"The sender's identity was previously verified but has changed"
}
VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice => {
"The sending device was not signed by the user's identity"
}
VerificationLevel::None(..) => "The sending device is not known",
};
write!(f, "{}", display)
}
}
/// The sub-enum containing detailed information on why we were not able to link
/// a message back to a device.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum DeviceLinkProblem {
/// The device is missing, either because it was deleted, or you haven't
/// yet downoaled it or the server is erroneously omitting it (federation
/// lag).
MissingDevice,
/// The key was obtained from an insecure source: imported from a file,
/// obtained from a legacy (asymmetric) backup, unsafe key forward, etc.
InsecureSource,
}
/// Recommended decorations for decrypted messages, representing the message's
/// authenticity properties.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum ShieldState {
/// A red shield with a tooltip containing the associated message should be
/// presented.
Red {
/// A machine-readable representation.
code: ShieldStateCode,
/// A human readable description.
message: &'static str,
},
/// A grey shield with a tooltip containing the associated message should be
/// presented.
Grey {
/// A machine-readable representation.
code: ShieldStateCode,
/// A human readable description.
message: &'static str,
},
/// No shield should be presented.
None,
}
/// A machine-readable representation of the authenticity for a `ShieldState`.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Eq, PartialEq)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "uniffi", derive(uniffi::Enum))]
#[cfg_attr(target_arch = "wasm32", wasm_bindgen)]
pub enum ShieldStateCode {
/// Not enough information available to check the authenticity.
AuthenticityNotGuaranteed,
/// The sending device isn't yet known by the Client.
UnknownDevice,
/// The sending device hasn't been verified by the sender.
UnsignedDevice,
/// The sender hasn't been verified by the Client's user.
UnverifiedIdentity,
/// An unencrypted event in an encrypted room.
SentInClear,
/// The sender was previously verified but changed their identity.
VerificationViolation,
}
/// The algorithm specific information of a decrypted event.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub enum AlgorithmInfo {
/// The info if the event was encrypted using m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2
MegolmV1AesSha2 {
/// The curve25519 key of the device that created the megolm decryption
/// key originally.
curve25519_key: String,
/// The signing keys that have created the megolm key that was used to
/// decrypt this session. This map will usually contain a single ed25519
/// key.
sender_claimed_keys: BTreeMap<DeviceKeyAlgorithm, String>,
},
}
/// Struct containing information on how an event was decrypted.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct EncryptionInfo {
/// The user ID of the event sender, note this is untrusted data unless the
/// `verification_state` is `Verified` as well.
pub sender: OwnedUserId,
/// The device ID of the device that sent us the event, note this is
/// untrusted data unless `verification_state` is `Verified` as well.
pub sender_device: Option<OwnedDeviceId>,
/// Information about the algorithm that was used to encrypt the event.
pub algorithm_info: AlgorithmInfo,
/// The verification state of the device that sent us the event, note this
/// is the state of the device at the time of decryption. It may change in
/// the future if a device gets verified or deleted.
///
/// Callers that persist this should mark the state as dirty when a device
/// change is received down the sync.
pub verification_state: VerificationState,
}
/// Represents a matrix room event that has been returned from `/sync`,
/// after initial processing.
///
/// Previously, this differed from [`TimelineEvent`] by wrapping an
/// [`AnySyncTimelineEvent`] instead of an [`AnyTimelineEvent`], but nowadays
/// they are essentially identical, and one of them should probably be removed.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct SyncTimelineEvent {
/// The event itself, together with any information on decryption.
pub kind: TimelineEventKind,
/// The push actions associated with this event.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub push_actions: Vec<Action>,
}
impl SyncTimelineEvent {
/// Create a new `SyncTimelineEvent` from the given raw event.
///
/// This is a convenience constructor for a plaintext event when you don't
/// need to set `push_action`, for example inside a test.
pub fn new(event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>) -> Self {
Self { kind: TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event }, push_actions: vec![] }
}
/// Create a new `SyncTimelineEvent` from the given raw event and push
/// actions.
///
/// This is a convenience constructor for a plaintext event, for example
/// inside a test.
pub fn new_with_push_actions(
event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>,
push_actions: Vec<Action>,
) -> Self {
Self { kind: TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event }, push_actions }
}
/// Create a new `SyncTimelineEvent` to represent the given decryption
/// failure.
pub fn new_utd_event(event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>, utd_info: UnableToDecryptInfo) -> Self {
Self { kind: TimelineEventKind::UnableToDecrypt { event, utd_info }, push_actions: vec![] }
}
/// Get the event id of this `SyncTimelineEvent` if the event has any valid
/// id.
pub fn event_id(&self) -> Option<OwnedEventId> {
self.kind.raw().get_field::<OwnedEventId>("event_id").ok().flatten()
}
/// Returns a reference to the (potentially decrypted) Matrix event inside
/// this `TimelineEvent`.
pub fn raw(&self) -> &Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
self.kind.raw()
}
/// If the event was a decrypted event that was successfully decrypted, get
/// its encryption info. Otherwise, `None`.
pub fn encryption_info(&self) -> Option<&EncryptionInfo> {
self.kind.encryption_info()
}
/// Takes ownership of this `TimelineEvent`, returning the (potentially
/// decrypted) Matrix event within.
pub fn into_raw(self) -> Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
self.kind.into_raw()
}
}
impl From<TimelineEvent> for SyncTimelineEvent {
fn from(o: TimelineEvent) -> Self {
Self { kind: o.kind, push_actions: o.push_actions.unwrap_or_default() }
}
}
impl From<DecryptedRoomEvent> for SyncTimelineEvent {
fn from(decrypted: DecryptedRoomEvent) -> Self {
let timeline_event: TimelineEvent = decrypted.into();
timeline_event.into()
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SyncTimelineEvent {
/// Custom deserializer for [`SyncTimelineEvent`], to support older formats.
///
/// Ideally we might use an untagged enum and then convert from that;
/// however, that doesn't work due to a [serde bug](https://github.com/serde-rs/json/issues/497).
///
/// Instead, we first deserialize into an unstructured JSON map, and then
/// inspect the json to figure out which format we have.
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
use serde_json::{Map, Value};
// First, deserialize to an unstructured JSON map
let value = Map::<String, Value>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
// If we have a top-level `event`, it's V0
if value.contains_key("event") {
let v0: SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV0 =
serde_json::from_value(Value::Object(value)).map_err(|e| {
serde::de::Error::custom(format!(
"Unable to deserialize V0-format SyncTimelineEvent: {}",
e
))
})?;
Ok(v0.into())
}
// Otherwise, it's V1
else {
let v1: SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV1 =
serde_json::from_value(Value::Object(value)).map_err(|e| {
serde::de::Error::custom(format!(
"Unable to deserialize V1-format SyncTimelineEvent: {}",
e
))
})?;
Ok(v1.into())
}
}
}
/// Represents a matrix room event that has been returned from a Matrix
/// client-server API endpoint such as `/messages`, after initial processing.
///
/// The "initial processing" includes an attempt to decrypt encrypted events, so
/// the main thing this adds over [`AnyTimelineEvent`] is information on
/// encryption.
///
/// Previously, this differed from [`SyncTimelineEvent`] by wrapping an
/// [`AnyTimelineEvent`] instead of an [`AnySyncTimelineEvent`], but nowadays
/// they are essentially identical, and one of them should probably be removed.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct TimelineEvent {
/// The event itself, together with any information on decryption.
pub kind: TimelineEventKind,
/// The push actions associated with this event, if we had sufficient
/// context to compute them.
pub push_actions: Option<Vec<Action>>,
}
impl TimelineEvent {
/// Create a new `TimelineEvent` from the given raw event.
///
/// This is a convenience constructor for a plaintext event when you don't
/// need to set `push_action`, for example inside a test.
pub fn new(event: Raw<AnyTimelineEvent>) -> Self {
Self {
// This conversion is unproblematic since a `SyncTimelineEvent` is just a
// `TimelineEvent` without the `room_id`. By converting the raw value in
// this way, we simply cause the `room_id` field in the json to be
// ignored by a subsequent deserialization.
kind: TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event: event.cast() },
push_actions: None,
}
}
/// Create a new `TimelineEvent` to represent the given decryption failure.
pub fn new_utd_event(event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>, utd_info: UnableToDecryptInfo) -> Self {
Self { kind: TimelineEventKind::UnableToDecrypt { event, utd_info }, push_actions: None }
}
/// Returns a reference to the (potentially decrypted) Matrix event inside
/// this `TimelineEvent`.
pub fn raw(&self) -> &Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
self.kind.raw()
}
/// If the event was a decrypted event that was successfully decrypted, get
/// its encryption info. Otherwise, `None`.
pub fn encryption_info(&self) -> Option<&EncryptionInfo> {
self.kind.encryption_info()
}
/// Takes ownership of this `TimelineEvent`, returning the (potentially
/// decrypted) Matrix event within.
pub fn into_raw(self) -> Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
self.kind.into_raw()
}
}
impl From<DecryptedRoomEvent> for TimelineEvent {
fn from(decrypted: DecryptedRoomEvent) -> Self {
Self { kind: TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(decrypted), push_actions: None }
}
}
/// The event within a [`TimelineEvent`] or [`SyncTimelineEvent`], together with
/// encryption data.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum TimelineEventKind {
/// A successfully-decrypted encrypted event.
Decrypted(DecryptedRoomEvent),
/// An encrypted event which could not be decrypted.
UnableToDecrypt {
/// The `m.room.encrypted` event. Depending on the source of the event,
/// it could actually be an [`AnyTimelineEvent`] (i.e., it may
/// have a `room_id` property).
event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>,
/// Information on the reason we failed to decrypt
utd_info: UnableToDecryptInfo,
},
/// An unencrypted event.
PlainText {
/// The actual event. Depending on the source of the event, it could
/// actually be a [`AnyTimelineEvent`] (which differs from
/// [`AnySyncTimelineEvent`] by the addition of a `room_id` property).
event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>,
},
}
impl TimelineEventKind {
/// Returns a reference to the (potentially decrypted) Matrix event inside
/// this `TimelineEvent`.
pub fn raw(&self) -> &Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
match self {
// It is safe to cast from an `AnyMessageLikeEvent` (i.e. JSON which does
// *not* contain a `state_key` and *does* contain a `room_id`) into an
// `AnySyncTimelineEvent` (i.e. JSON which *may* contain a `state_key` and is *not*
// expected to contain a `room_id`). It just means that the `room_id` will be ignored
// in a future deserialization.
TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(d) => d.event.cast_ref(),
TimelineEventKind::UnableToDecrypt { event, .. } => event.cast_ref(),
TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event } => event,
}
}
/// If the event was a decrypted event that was successfully decrypted, get
/// its encryption info. Otherwise, `None`.
pub fn encryption_info(&self) -> Option<&EncryptionInfo> {
match self {
TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(d) => Some(&d.encryption_info),
TimelineEventKind::UnableToDecrypt { .. } => None,
TimelineEventKind::PlainText { .. } => None,
}
}
/// Takes ownership of this `TimelineEvent`, returning the (potentially
/// decrypted) Matrix event within.
pub fn into_raw(self) -> Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent> {
match self {
// It is safe to cast from an `AnyMessageLikeEvent` (i.e. JSON which does
// *not* contain a `state_key` and *does* contain a `room_id`) into an
// `AnySyncTimelineEvent` (i.e. JSON which *may* contain a `state_key` and is *not*
// expected to contain a `room_id`). It just means that the `room_id` will be ignored
// in a future deserialization.
TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(d) => d.event.cast(),
TimelineEventKind::UnableToDecrypt { event, .. } => event.cast(),
TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event } => event,
}
}
}
#[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))]
impl fmt::Debug for TimelineEventKind {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match &self {
Self::PlainText { event } => f
.debug_struct("TimelineEventDecryptionResult::PlainText")
.field("event", &DebugRawEvent(event))
.finish(),
Self::UnableToDecrypt { event, utd_info } => f
.debug_struct("TimelineEventDecryptionResult::UnableToDecrypt")
.field("event", &DebugRawEvent(event))
.field("utd_info", &utd_info)
.finish(),
Self::Decrypted(decrypted) => {
f.debug_tuple("TimelineEventDecryptionResult::Decrypted").field(decrypted).finish()
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// A successfully-decrypted encrypted event.
pub struct DecryptedRoomEvent {
/// The decrypted event.
pub event: Raw<AnyMessageLikeEvent>,
/// The encryption info about the event.
pub encryption_info: EncryptionInfo,
/// The encryption info about the events bundled in the `unsigned`
/// object.
///
/// Will be `None` if no bundled event was encrypted.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub unsigned_encryption_info: Option<BTreeMap<UnsignedEventLocation, UnsignedDecryptionResult>>,
}
#[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))]
impl fmt::Debug for DecryptedRoomEvent {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
let DecryptedRoomEvent { event, encryption_info, unsigned_encryption_info } = self;
f.debug_struct("DecryptedRoomEvent")
.field("event", &DebugRawEvent(event))
.field("encryption_info", encryption_info)
.maybe_field("unsigned_encryption_info", unsigned_encryption_info)
.finish()
}
}
/// The location of an event bundled in an `unsigned` object.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum UnsignedEventLocation {
/// An event at the `m.replace` key of the `m.relations` object, that is a
/// bundled replacement.
RelationsReplace,
/// An event at the `latest_event` key of the `m.thread` object of the
/// `m.relations` object, that is the latest event of a thread.
RelationsThreadLatestEvent,
}
impl UnsignedEventLocation {
/// Find the mutable JSON value at this location in the given unsigned
/// object.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `unsigned` - The `unsigned` property of an event as a JSON object.
pub fn find_mut<'a>(&self, unsigned: &'a mut JsonObject) -> Option<&'a mut serde_json::Value> {
let relations = unsigned.get_mut("m.relations")?.as_object_mut()?;
match self {
Self::RelationsReplace => relations.get_mut("m.replace"),
Self::RelationsThreadLatestEvent => {
relations.get_mut("m.thread")?.as_object_mut()?.get_mut("latest_event")
}
}
}
}
/// The result of the decryption of an event bundled in an `unsigned` object.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum UnsignedDecryptionResult {
/// The event was successfully decrypted.
Decrypted(EncryptionInfo),
/// The event failed to be decrypted.
UnableToDecrypt(UnableToDecryptInfo),
}
/// Metadata about an event that could not be decrypted.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UnableToDecryptInfo {
/// The ID of the session used to encrypt the message, if it used the
/// `m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2` algorithm.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub session_id: Option<String>,
/// Reason code for the decryption failure
#[serde(default = "unknown_utd_reason")]
pub reason: UnableToDecryptReason,
}
fn unknown_utd_reason() -> UnableToDecryptReason {
UnableToDecryptReason::Unknown
}
/// Reason code for a decryption failure
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum UnableToDecryptReason {
/// The reason for the decryption failure is unknown. This is only intended
/// for use when deserializing old UnableToDecryptInfo instances.
#[doc(hidden)]
Unknown,
/// The `m.room.encrypted` event that should have been decrypted is
/// malformed in some way (e.g. unsupported algorithm, missing fields,
/// unknown megolm message type).
MalformedEncryptedEvent,
/// Decryption failed because we're missing the megolm session that was used
/// to encrypt the event.
///
/// TODO: support withheld codes?
MissingMegolmSession,
/// Decryption failed because, while we have the megolm session that was
/// used to encrypt the message, it is ratcheted too far forward.
UnknownMegolmMessageIndex,
/// We found the Megolm session, but were unable to decrypt the event using
/// that session for some reason (e.g. incorrect MAC).
///
/// This represents all `vodozemac::megolm::DecryptionError`s, except
/// `UnknownMessageIndex`, which is represented as
/// `UnknownMegolmMessageIndex`.
MegolmDecryptionFailure,
/// The event could not be deserialized after decryption.
PayloadDeserializationFailure,
/// Decryption failed because of a mismatch between the identity keys of the
/// device we received the room key from and the identity keys recorded in
/// the plaintext of the room key to-device message.
MismatchedIdentityKeys,
/// An encrypted message wasn't decrypted, because the sender's
/// cross-signing identity did not satisfy the requested
/// `TrustRequirement`.
SenderIdentityNotTrusted(VerificationLevel),
}
impl UnableToDecryptReason {
/// Returns true if this UTD is due to a missing room key (and hence might
/// resolve itself if we wait a bit.)
pub fn is_missing_room_key(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::MissingMegolmSession | Self::UnknownMegolmMessageIndex)
}
}
/// Deserialization helper for [`SyncTimelineEvent`], for the modern format.
///
/// This has the exact same fields as [`SyncTimelineEvent`] itself, but has a
/// regular `Deserialize` implementation.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV1 {
/// The event itself, together with any information on decryption.
kind: TimelineEventKind,
/// The push actions associated with this event.
#[serde(default)]
push_actions: Vec<Action>,
}
impl From<SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV1> for SyncTimelineEvent {
fn from(value: SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV1) -> Self {
let SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV1 { kind, push_actions } = value;
SyncTimelineEvent { kind, push_actions }
}
}
/// Deserialization helper for [`SyncTimelineEvent`], for an older format.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV0 {
/// The actual event.
event: Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>,
/// The encryption info about the event. Will be `None` if the event
/// was not encrypted.
encryption_info: Option<EncryptionInfo>,
/// The push actions associated with this event.
#[serde(default)]
push_actions: Vec<Action>,
/// The encryption info about the events bundled in the `unsigned`
/// object.
///
/// Will be `None` if no bundled event was encrypted.
unsigned_encryption_info: Option<BTreeMap<UnsignedEventLocation, UnsignedDecryptionResult>>,
}
impl From<SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV0> for SyncTimelineEvent {
fn from(value: SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV0) -> Self {
let SyncTimelineEventDeserializationHelperV0 {
event,
encryption_info,
push_actions,
unsigned_encryption_info,
} = value;
let kind = match encryption_info {
Some(encryption_info) => {
TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(DecryptedRoomEvent {
// We cast from `Raw<AnySyncTimelineEvent>` to
// `Raw<AnyMessageLikeEvent>`, which means
// we are asserting that it contains a room_id.
// That *should* be ok, because if this is genuinely a decrypted
// room event (as the encryption_info indicates), then it will have
// a room_id.
event: event.cast(),
encryption_info,
unsigned_encryption_info,
})
}
None => TimelineEventKind::PlainText { event },
};
SyncTimelineEvent { kind, push_actions }
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use assert_matches::assert_matches;
use ruma::{
event_id,
events::{room::message::RoomMessageEventContent, AnySyncTimelineEvent},
serde::Raw,
user_id,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde_json::json;
use super::{
AlgorithmInfo, DecryptedRoomEvent, EncryptionInfo, SyncTimelineEvent, TimelineEvent,
TimelineEventKind, UnableToDecryptInfo, UnableToDecryptReason, UnsignedDecryptionResult,
UnsignedEventLocation, VerificationState,
};
use crate::deserialized_responses::{DeviceLinkProblem, VerificationLevel};
fn example_event() -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"content": RoomMessageEventContent::text_plain("secret"),
"type": "m.room.message",
"event_id": "$xxxxx:example.org",
"room_id": "!someroom:example.com",
"origin_server_ts": 2189,
"sender": "@carl:example.com",
})
}
#[test]
fn sync_timeline_debug_content() {
let room_event = SyncTimelineEvent::new(Raw::new(&example_event()).unwrap().cast());
let debug_s = format!("{room_event:?}");
assert!(
!debug_s.contains("secret"),
"Debug representation contains event content!\n{debug_s}"
);
}
#[test]
fn room_event_to_sync_room_event() {
let room_event = TimelineEvent::new(Raw::new(&example_event()).unwrap().cast());
let converted_room_event: SyncTimelineEvent = room_event.into();
let converted_event: AnySyncTimelineEvent =
converted_room_event.raw().deserialize().unwrap();
assert_eq!(converted_event.event_id(), "$xxxxx:example.org");
assert_eq!(converted_event.sender(), "@carl:example.com");
}
#[test]
fn old_verification_state_to_new_migration() {
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct State {
state: VerificationState,
}
let state = json!({
"state": "Trusted",
});
let deserialized: State =
serde_json::from_value(state).expect("We can deserialize the old trusted value");
assert_eq!(deserialized.state, VerificationState::Verified);
let state = json!({
"state": "UnknownDevice",
});
let deserialized: State =
serde_json::from_value(state).expect("We can deserialize the old unknown device value");
assert_eq!(
deserialized.state,
VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::None(
DeviceLinkProblem::MissingDevice
))
);
let state = json!({
"state": "Untrusted",
});
let deserialized: State =
serde_json::from_value(state).expect("We can deserialize the old trusted value");
assert_eq!(
deserialized.state,
VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice)
);
}
#[test]
fn sync_timeline_event_serialisation() {
let room_event = SyncTimelineEvent {
kind: TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(DecryptedRoomEvent {
event: Raw::new(&example_event()).unwrap().cast(),
encryption_info: EncryptionInfo {
sender: user_id!("@sender:example.com").to_owned(),
sender_device: None,
algorithm_info: AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 {
curve25519_key: "xxx".to_owned(),
sender_claimed_keys: Default::default(),
},
verification_state: VerificationState::Verified,
},
unsigned_encryption_info: Some(BTreeMap::from([(
UnsignedEventLocation::RelationsReplace,
UnsignedDecryptionResult::UnableToDecrypt(UnableToDecryptInfo {
session_id: Some("xyz".to_owned()),
reason: UnableToDecryptReason::MalformedEncryptedEvent,
}),
)])),
}),
push_actions: Default::default(),
};
let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&room_event).unwrap();
// Test that the serialization is as expected
assert_eq!(
serialized,
json!({
"kind": {
"Decrypted": {
"event": {
"content": {"body": "secret", "msgtype": "m.text"},
"event_id": "$xxxxx:example.org",
"origin_server_ts": 2189,
"room_id": "!someroom:example.com",
"sender": "@carl:example.com",
"type": "m.room.message",
},
"encryption_info": {
"sender": "@sender:example.com",
"sender_device": null,
"algorithm_info": {
"MegolmV1AesSha2": {
"curve25519_key": "xxx",
"sender_claimed_keys": {}
}
},
"verification_state": "Verified",
},
"unsigned_encryption_info": {
"RelationsReplace": {"UnableToDecrypt": {
"session_id": "xyz",
"reason": "MalformedEncryptedEvent",
}}
}
}
}
})
);
// And it can be properly deserialized from the new format.
let event: SyncTimelineEvent = serde_json::from_value(serialized).unwrap();
assert_eq!(event.event_id(), Some(event_id!("$xxxxx:example.org").to_owned()));
assert_matches!(
event.encryption_info().unwrap().algorithm_info,
AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 { .. }
);
// Test that the previous format can also be deserialized.
let serialized = json!({
"event": {
"content": {"body": "secret", "msgtype": "m.text"},
"event_id": "$xxxxx:example.org",
"origin_server_ts": 2189,
"room_id": "!someroom:example.com",
"sender": "@carl:example.com",
"type": "m.room.message",
},
"encryption_info": {
"sender": "@sender:example.com",
"sender_device": null,
"algorithm_info": {
"MegolmV1AesSha2": {
"curve25519_key": "xxx",
"sender_claimed_keys": {}
}
},
"verification_state": "Verified",
},
});
let event: SyncTimelineEvent = serde_json::from_value(serialized).unwrap();
assert_eq!(event.event_id(), Some(event_id!("$xxxxx:example.org").to_owned()));
assert_matches!(
event.encryption_info().unwrap().algorithm_info,
AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 { .. }
);
// Test that the previous format, with an undecryptable unsigned event, can also
// be deserialized.
let serialized = json!({
"event": {
"content": {"body": "secret", "msgtype": "m.text"},
"event_id": "$xxxxx:example.org",
"origin_server_ts": 2189,
"room_id": "!someroom:example.com",
"sender": "@carl:example.com",
"type": "m.room.message",
},
"encryption_info": {
"sender": "@sender:example.com",
"sender_device": null,
"algorithm_info": {
"MegolmV1AesSha2": {
"curve25519_key": "xxx",
"sender_claimed_keys": {}
}
},
"verification_state": "Verified",
},
"unsigned_encryption_info": {
"RelationsReplace": {"UnableToDecrypt": {"session_id": "xyz"}}
}
});
let event: SyncTimelineEvent = serde_json::from_value(serialized).unwrap();
assert_eq!(event.event_id(), Some(event_id!("$xxxxx:example.org").to_owned()));
assert_matches!(
event.encryption_info().unwrap().algorithm_info,
AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 { .. }
);
assert_matches!(event.kind, TimelineEventKind::Decrypted(decrypted) => {
assert_matches!(decrypted.unsigned_encryption_info, Some(map) => {
assert_eq!(map.len(), 1);
let (location, result) = map.into_iter().next().unwrap();
assert_eq!(location, UnsignedEventLocation::RelationsReplace);
assert_matches!(result, UnsignedDecryptionResult::UnableToDecrypt(utd_info) => {
assert_eq!(utd_info.session_id, Some("xyz".to_owned()));
assert_eq!(utd_info.reason, UnableToDecryptReason::Unknown);
})
});
});
}
}